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Abstract— Wireless communications are potentially exposed to 
jamming due to the openness of the medium and, in particular, to 
virtual jamming, which allows more energy-efficient attacks. In 
this paper we tackle the problem of virtual jamming attacks on 
IEEE 802.11 networks and present a data fusion solution for the 
detection of a type of virtual jamming attack (namely, NAV 
attacks), based on the real-time monitoring of a set of metrics. 
The detection performance is evaluated in a number of real 
scenarios. 
Index Terms—Measurements and networking, measurements 
on wireless networks, virtual jamming attacks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The easily accessible shared transmission channel of 
wireless systems is both an advantage in terms of usability but 
also poses an important vulnerability aspect. The open nature 
of wireless networks exposes the communication channel to a 
number of attacks that are difficult to trace [1], [2], such as 
jamming. The jamming attack is one of the most serious threats 
to wireless systems. Today, jamming attacks are very common 
and rather easy to implement, considering the number of off-
the-shelf tools available ([3], [4] and [5]). Jamming attacks can 
be classified into physical and virtual jamming. Examples of 
the former are: radio jamming, where the attacker transmits 
continuously a radio signal carrying random bits, and the 
collision attack, where the attacker sends a packet only when it 
senses that a legitimate user is sending a valid packet in order 
to cause a collision [6]. Examples of virtual jamming are the 
spurious RTS/CTS attack, which is carried out by sending fake 
RTS frames, and NAV attacks, where the attacker alters the 
duration field of legitimate packets. Both attacks aim to delay 
legal frame transmissions. Unlike physical jamming, virtual 
jamming is very easy to implement and needs little power to 
carry out the attack. 
The literature provides solutions, which deal with a wide 
range of jamming threats in simulated environments like 
Network Simulation (NS) [7] and GloMoSim [8] or introduces 
MAC layer changes in the IEEE 802.11 protocol. In this work, 
we tackle the problem of the virtual jamming attacks and 
propose a new solution to detect NAV attacks based on 
Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory. Data fusion has been widely 
used for traffic classification purposes [9], while the proposed 
solution has been previously proven to successfully detect de-
authentication attack and Man-in-the-Middle attacks on 802.11 
networks [10]. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II 
analyses the state of the art for jamming attacks in IEEE 802.11 
networks. An explanation of our attack is described in Section 
III, introducing a novel mechanism to prevent the attack along 
with the best metrics to detect it. In Section IV, the 
implementation of the attack and the testbed are described in 
detail, concluding with the analysis of the detection results. 
Finally, in Section V the conclusions are presented. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Jamming attacks have been widely researched in the past 
[11] – [16], offering multiple solutions which tackle the 
problem for a wide range of jamming attacks. 
In [11] the authors present DOMINO, a piece of software 
installed in or near an access point in order to detect MAC 
Layer greedy behaviour in 802.11 hotspots. DOMINO is 
organised in three modules: (i) Deviation Estimation 
Component (DEC), (ii) Anomaly Detection Component (ADC) 
and (iii) Decision Making Component (DMC). The DEC 
module performs the following tests: retransmission 
consistency, DIFS consistency, NAV consistency and backoff 
manipulation test. DOMINO runs the tests for each node by 
tracking each node’s transmissions in the network. Therefore, 
the way the tests are computed might become time and 
resource consuming when the number of nodes is increased 
[12]. DOMINO’s performance is assessed through the 
simulator NS. The results show that DOMINO is characterised 
by high accuracy of detection and resiliency to several factors, 
such as traffic type. 
In [13], the authors propose a distributed cross-layer 
detection system for a wide range of jamming attacks. The 
monitoring functionality is randomly distributed among the 
nodes and the detection mechanism is organised in two phases. 
In the first phase, the system performs 4 tests on: (i) the 
physical idle time, (ii) the average number of RTS/CTS frames 
transmitted by a node, (iii) the virtual idle time (NAV) and (iv) 
the average number of retransmissions of a node. In the second 
phase, the results are put all together and then a final test is 
carried out in order to increase the accuracy. It’s worth noting 
that the solution presented in [13] needs to carry out the tests 
for each node in the network. Therefore, the solution is time 
and resource consuming when increasing the number of the 
nodes. The performance is assessed through the simulator 
GloMoSim and the results show that: (i) as the number of 
nodes increases, the more the DRD (Data Rate Detection) 
decreases, and (ii) the number of false positive increases when 
increasing the number of the nodes. 
In [14] the authors propose a detection algorithm based on 
thresholds that is able to detect and classify physical and virtual 
jamming attacks. The algorithm needs the following metrics as 
inputs: PDR (Packet Delivery Ratio) and PSR (Packets Send 
Ratio). The algorithm’s outcomes are compared with a Signal 
Strength Consistency check in order to improve the overall 
system’s accuracy. The consistency test is necessary because, 
as the authors suggest, the PDR might be low since a node 
might be running out of battery or if user is moving out of the 
coverage area. The used metrics have to be calculated for each 
node, and moreover data has to be retrieved from transmitting 
and receiving nodes during the jamming attack. The way data 
are collected during the attack makes the solution an off-line 
solution. The authors provide simulated results by using NS 
which are characterised by high accuracy and precision rates. 
In [15] the authors propose a distributed solution to detect 
jamming attacks at the physical layer. In detail, the method is 
based on the detection of changes in the statistical 
characteristics of the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). The 
detection is carried out locally by using either a simple-
threshold algorithm or a cusum-type algorithm. The authors 
also present an improved version based on DS theory 
characterised by high Detection Rates (DRs) and low False 
Positive Rates (FPrs). The improved version based on cusum 
algorithm provides very high DRs and FPrs while the improved 
version based on the simple threshold algorithm provides a 
further increase of 80% of the DRs and FPrs. The authors do 
not provide any assessment about algorithm performance in 
scenarios like hidden terminal or fading channel. 
Finally, in [16] the authors focus on virtual jamming 
attacks, providing a protection scheme, which is implemented 
in the MAC layer. In detail, it needs two MAC layer timers as 
well as a NAV timer. The RTS timer and the CTS timer, to 
track the RTS-DATA and the CTS-ACK sequences. Regarding 
the RTS timer, if no header data is received at the beginning of 
the RTS time, then the NAV time is set to zero and the node is 
ready to transmit. Regarding the CTS timer, if no expected 
ACK frame is received after the CTS frame, the NAV timer 
will be set to zero and the node is ready to transmit. The overall 
solution represents a variant from the original IEEE 802.11 
protocol. The performances were assessed by using NS. The 
results show that during a virtual jamming attack the 
throughput of legitimate users do not experience any effects. 
In this work, we present a new solution to detect NAV 
attack on 802.11 networks. Unlike the solutions presented 
earlier, it is implemented as a light, centralised and on-line 
solution. The detector is implemented as a single monitoring 
machine, which derives the metrics by observing the ongoing 
traffic. The performance of our solution has been assessed in 
several real scenarios providing good results in terms of high 
DRs, low FPrs and FNrs (False Negative Rates). 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
A. Attack Description 
The NAV attack exploits the virtual-sense mechanism, 
which aims to mitigate the collisions resulting from the hidden-
terminal problem. Specifically, the header of each 802.11 
packets contains a particular field, named duration, which 
determines the time (in milliseconds) needed to transmit the 
packet on the channel and the time interval during which the 
channel will be busy. Every network node reads the value of 
the duration field in order to set its own NAV timer. Assuming 
that the channel is busy and another node has something to 
transmit, those nodes will have to wait a period equal to NAV 
in order to transmit. After that, those nodes start decreasing 
their backoff time again. Finally, when the backoff timer 
reaches zero, if the channel is idle then the nodes start 
transmitting otherwise, they defer their transmission once 
again. 
To carry out a NAV attack, the attacker needs to overwrite 
two mechanisms of the IEEE 802.11 protocol: the RTS/CTS 
mechanism and the procedure to calculate the backoff time. 
With regards to the RTS/CTS mechanism, the field duration of 
each RTS packet is set to the maximum NAV value 32767 
(32ms). All nodes listening on the channel will set their NAV 
timers. On the other hand, the contention window of the 
backoff calculation mechanism is set to zero so that the 
attacker is able to transmit in the very first free time slot. 
B. Attack Detection Methodology 
The proposed attack detection methodology is based on the 
use of evidence theory. In recent years, the theory of belief 
functions, also known as the evidence theory developed by 
Dempster and Shafer [17], has drawn the attention of many 
researchers, especially in the fields of sensor and data fusion 
[18]. DS theory provides a simple framework to merge 
information coming from different sensors (DS rule), taking 
into account all the available evidence in uncertain situations. 
The DS theory does not require prior knowledge, enables a 
way of measuring ignorance, when the evaluated data cannot 
be allocated within the normal or abnormal hypothesis. 
Furthermore, it has also proved to be a viable solution in cases 
where it is impossible to apply classical sensor fusion 
techniques, such as Kalman filter or Bayesian networks, or 
even when it is virtually impossible to find a pattern in the 
system behaviour to build an appropriate model [15]. Although 
DS theory inflicts additional computational load when 
computing mass functions, reducing the number of hypothesis 
to three makes this theory applicable to a live detection system. 
Before introducing our solution in detail, we briefly 
introduce some basic concepts about DS theory. 
1) Dempster-Shafer Theory 
The DS theory starts by taking into account a set of events 
Θ ൌ ሼߠଵ, ߠଶ, … , ߠ௡ሽ (known as Frame of Discernment), which 
is a finite set of all possible mutually exclusive propositions 
and hypotheses about some problem domain. The total number 
of subsets of Θ, defined by the number of hypotheses, is 
defined by the power set P(Θ). 
Each subset from Θ is assigned a probability value, or a 
confidence interval within [0, 1], by an observer from the mass 
probability function m using the basic probability assignment 
function. The Basic Probability Assignment function (BPA) is 
defined as a function m: P(Θ) → [0, 1] satisfying the following 
three conditions [17]: 
 ݉ሺ׎ሻ ൌ 0 (1) 
 ݉ሺܣሻ ൒ 0, ׊ ܣ كΘ (2) 
 ∑ ݉ሺܣሻ ൌ 1஺ ك ஀  (3) 
The function m(A) describes the measure of belief that is 
committed exactly to the hypothesis A. It is worth noting that, 
in contrast to probability theory, DS theory does not comply 
with the Additivity Rule.  
The DS theory is a technique that combines evidence of 
information from different observers with similar Θ using the 
DS rule of combination [17]. Let m1(A) and m2(A) be the BPA 
in the hypothesis A, from observer 1 and 2, respectively. DS 
rule of combination calculates the orthogonal summation of the 
BPAs values in one hypothesis from two different observers 
into a single belief (m1(A)⊕m2(A)). After defining the BPA 
value for each hypothesis, the information from the sensors is 
merged as follows: 
 ݉௖௢௠௕ሺܪሻ ൌ  ∑ ௠భሺ௑ሻכ௠మሺ௒ሻ೉ תೊసಹଵି ∑ ௠భሺ௑ሻכ௠మሺ௒ሻ೉ תೊస ׎  ׊ ܪ ് ׎ (4) 
Further details on DS theory can be found in [14]. 
2) Proposed Detection Method 
A hard and delicate issue that affects the developing phase 
of a detector is how to define the BPA values. In the literature 
there exist multiple ways of assigning probabilities to each of 
the hypotheses in DS theory, ranging from data mining 
techniques to empirical approaches. However, none of these 
works provide methods to find an automatic and self-adaptive 
process of BPA, and few of them could be used off-the-shelf 
without a previous training or fine tuning period. 
The proposed methodology to detect virtual jamming is 
based on the basic probability functions proposed in [10]. The 
framework proved to be successful detecting one type of Man-
in-the-Middle attack and de-authentication attack on wireless 
networks. Additionally, the proposed solution also proved to be 
fast enough to detect the attacks in real-time. 
Initially, the algorithm gathers a number of incoming 
frames and, for each frame, a series of metrics are extracted. 
Then, using the gathered frames, the statistical characteristics 
of each individual metric are calculated. In particular, the mean 
and the mode that are used as reference of normality, as well as 
the distribution of the data. These statistical parameters 
represent the signature of the well-behaved wireless clients, 
and these are compared to the metric values of each individual 
frame that is analysed. After computing all these statistical 
parameters, the BPA value for each individual metric is 
calculated using the methodology proposed in [10].  
For our experiments, the three different hypotheses are {A} 
Attack (the analysed frame is malicious), {N} Normal (the 
analysed frame is non-malicious) and {U} Uncertainty (refers 
to the level of ignorance). 
After the different BPAs are calculated, these values are 
fused using the DS theory. The DS rule allows combining 
evidence from only two observers at a time. Therefore, the 
different BPA values are combined after several consecutive 
iterations. The resulting BPAs indicate which hypotheses 
receive the highest evidence of support. 
It is worth noting that the proposed methodology works in a 
sliding window scheme, as a FIFO queue of prefixed size. If 
the currently analysed frame is judged to be normal, it is 
pushed to the end of the sliding window, the oldest frame is 
pushed out of the window, and the analysed frame will be used 
to compute new BPA values. Otherwise, the current frame is 
simply dropped. The window size affects the algorithm 
performance and side effects are investigated in Section IV. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Testbed architecture 
IV. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 
A. Testbed Description 
To assess the detection method performance, an 
experimental testbed has been set up and it is depicted in Fig. 
2. It comprises 3 types of nodes, as well as an Access Point 
(AP): 
1. Attacker. It runs on Linux Ubuntu 10.04 Lucid Lynx. The 
NIC (Network Interface Controller) is equipped with an 
Atheros 5100 chip, which is supported by the legacy driver 
ATH5000 for Atheros chipsets. The RTS/CTS mechanism 
and backoff calculation mechanism have been modified ad 
hoc, as described in Section III. The driver is loaded as a 
new module in the kernel, forcing an automated bound 
with the hardware during the system initialisation. 
2. Monitor. This station is a monitor node equipped with the 
same Atheros chipset as the attacker and it is configured in 
Monitor Mode to listen to the channel. We used Wireshark 
[19] to collect the traffic. Furthermore, we used our 
modified version of ATH5000 driver to gather live 
statistics from the wireless interface card, i.e. CRC error. 
The monitor node is placed close the AP.  
3. Client. We used two clients during our experiments, 
namely ClientA and ClientB. Both clients act as well-
behaved users, sending traffic during the whole monitoring 
period. The traffic was artificially generated using the iperf 
linux command [20] to send constant bit rate UDP traffic 
in data frames. 
The experimental campaign is summarised in Table I. In 
detail, in order to validate our solution, a list of 9 scenarios is 
proposed, including fixed and mobile well-behaved users. The 
first two scenarios are normal scenarios without any attack. As 
regards scenarios from 3 to 9, each of them has a total duration 
of 90 seconds and includes three phases: i) initial phase, where 
only the well-behaved node/s send traffic, ii) attack phase, 
where the attack is launched, and iii) final phase, where the 
attacker is deactivated in order to recover normality. Each 
phase has a duration of 30 seconds. 
TABLE I.  EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION 
Scenario 
# Description 
1 No attacker, fixed ClientA and ClientB  
2 No attacker, fixed ClientA and fixed ClientB 
(with high NAV value) 
3 Fixed ClientA 
4 Fixed ClientA and ClientB 
5 Moving ClientA 
6 Moving ClientA and ClientB 
7 Fixed ClientA and moving ClientB 
8 Moving ClientA and fixed ClientB 
9 Fixed ClientB sending TCP traffic 
 
The test cases have been designed to emulate actual 
scenarios in WiFi networks. They include scenarios where a 
client is located in a fixed position, keeping a constant distance 
to the AP to maintain stable parameters in the received radio 
signal, as well as situations in which random movement was 
introduced to emulate an actual mobile situation. The 
movement reproduced a normal walking pace within an indoor 
environment, keeping the distance between 1 meter, equivalent 
to the fixed position, up to a maximum of 10 meters far from 
the AP. Mixed scenarios are also taken into account, including 
both fixed and moving nodes to assess the performance of the 
detection algorithm within the same room, when multiple 
clients are competing for the available resources. To conclude, 
a test using TCP was carried out to study how the jamming 
attack could affect the establishment of a TCP connection, 
which requires the completion of a three-way handshake 
process successfully to enable a communication link. 
B. Metrics 
Regarding the metrics to monitor, the presented literature 
drove us through the selection process. The metrics monitored 
are: NAV, frame deltatime and FSN (Frame Sequence 
Number). Monitoring NAV to detect a greedy behaviour or 
NAV attack is common in the literature [11], [13] and [16]. 
However, detecting intelligent jamming attacks by simply 
monitoring NAV is not a robust solution, because even if the 
intelligent jammer exploits high values of the NAV to carry out 
the attack, those values remain legitimate [21]. In [13], [14] 
and [21], the authors suggest using metrics related to the 
number of packets sent and received such as PDR, PSR and 
channel utilisation, in order to detect several types of attacks. 
We included in our analysis a similar metric: frames deltatime. 
Frame deltatime is obviously affected by the attack since the 
main effect of a jamming attack is a service disruption, causing 
bandwidth reduction and an increase in the deltatime between 
two consecutive transmitted frames. Finally, we took into 
consideration the FSN metric which has detectable peaks in the 
first order time differences of the frame sequence numbers, 
DiffFSN. The FSN metric presents the aforementioned peaks 
in its first order time difference because the WiFi card buffers 
overflow during the attack and it causes dropped packets. 
Finally, the performance of our solution is evaluated by 
using the following metrics: (i) Detection Rate ܦܴ ൌ  ்௉்௉ାிே 
where TP stands for True Positive and FN stands for False 
Negative, (ii) False Positive rate ܨܲݎ ൌ  ி௉ி௉ାிே where FP 
stands for False Positive and FN stands for False Negative and 
(iii) False Negative rate ܨܰݎ ൌ  ிே்௉ାிே. 
C. Experimental Results 
The presented solution has been preliminary tested on the 
first two scenarios in Table I, when no attack is ongoing, in 
order to check the performance of our solution in term of FPr. 
The scenario 1 has two legitimate nodes with both low 
NAV value, whereas the scenario 2 has two legitimate nodes 
but one with a low NAV value and the other one with a 
naturally high NAV value. 
The experimental results for these two scenarios are 
reported in Table II, for each combination of metrics. The 
results show that the best single metric combination in term of 
lowest FPrs is the NAV. However, while the FPr for the NAV 
metric is around 2% in scenario 1, it rises up to 17% in 
scenario 2. Such worsening in the performance is due to the 
fact that in scenario 2, one of the legitimate users has set a high 
NAV value, which confuses the algorithm and causes false 
positive. In fact, the frames with the high NAV value are 17% 
of the total frames in the second scenario and all of them have 
been detected as malicious frames. As regards the multiple 
metric combinations, all of them exhibit similar performance, 
with an FPr equal to (about) 25%, which unfortunately does 
not represent a performance enhancement in scenario 2. The 
detection algorithm thus suffers from false positives when 
legitimate users have high NAV values.  
TABLE II.  FPRS FOR SCENARIOS 1 AND 2 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
NAV 2% 19% 
DiffFSN 25% 38% 
Deltatime 86% 86% 
NAV, Deltatime 86% 86% 
NAV, DiffFSN 25% 25% 
Deltatime, DiffFSN 23% 25% 
Deltatime, DiffFSN, NAV 23% 25% 
 
The experimental results are presented in Table III. The 
table reports the performance evaluation of our methodology in 
terms of DRrs, FPrs and FNrs for different combination of 
metrics and for each scenario in Table I. The results presented 
in Table II have been obtained using a sliding window size of 
20 samples. 
Among all the evaluated combination of metrics, making 
use of the single metric NAV provides the best results in terms 
of high DRs, low FNrs and FPrs in all the tested scenarios. 
Fig.3 shows the NAV metric over time.  
The single metric Deltatime exhibits high DRs with 
likewise high FPrs. These bad results are due to the fact that 
legitimate clients cannot send any frames over the wireless 
medium during the attack and, in consequence, the monitoring 
system cannot update the metrics for the calculation of the 
respective beliefs. Fig. 4 shows the Deltatime over time. The 
evidence of an attack is visible in the Deltatime only at end of 
the attack apart from some occasional spikes during the attack. 
The single metric DiffFSN exhibits the worst results among 
the single metric combinations with low DRs, low FPr and 
high FNr. The DiffFSN metric, like the metric Deltatime, 
cannot be update by the monitoring system during the attack. 
Fig. 5 shows the DiffFSN over time. The evidence of an attack 
is visible in the DiffFSN only at end of the attack. 
The multiple metrics combinations do not provide any 
improvement in comparison with the result obtained by the 
single metric combination NAV. 
In detail, the multiple metrics combination NAV, Deltatime 
provides high DR but high FPr. It worth noting that the results 
are very similar to the single metric combination Deltatime. No 
improvements are shown bringing in the further evidence 
provided by Deltatime metric. 
Finally, the multiple metrics combinations NAV, DiffFSN 
and NAV, Deltatime and DiffFSN provide the worst results 
with low DRs, high FNrs and low FPrs. 
The best metrics combination in term of DRs, FNrs and 
FPrs is the single metric combination NAV. A graphical 
summary of the results discussion is provided in fig. 5, which 
depicts bars plots of the minimum, average and maximum 
value for the considered performances indicators grouped by 
metric combination among all the scenarios. However, any 
solution to detect NAV attack based on the single metric NAV 
is completely lack of robustness as the NAV value takes totally 
legitimate values during the attack. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  NAV metric in Scenario 7. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we have tackled the problem of identifying 
virtual jamming attacks on IEEE 802.11 networks and 
presented a solution based on DS theory aimed at detecting 
NAV attacks.  
 
Fig. 3.  DiffFSN in Scenario 6. 
 
Fig. 4.  Deltatime in Scenario 4. 
The solution has been tested on real wireless scenarios, 
showing good results in terms of DRs and FNrs. However, the 
proposed detection method suffers from high FPr when there is 
no attack ongoing and one of the users has legitimately high 
NAV values. Future work will be focused on the mitigation of 
the effects of FPr, which prevent the proposed methodology 
from being considered as a viable solution in operating 
networks. In particular, ongoing activity aims to investigate 
further metrics to be used in combination with NAV, in order 
to have a more robust solution.  
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Fig. 5.  Results in bars plots. Blue-painted bars, red-painted bars and green-painted bars represents respectively the minimum, the average  
and the maximum value of the considered performance indicator among all the scenarios for the different combination metrics. 
TABLE III.  RESULTS 
Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
Dr FNr FPr Dr FNr FPr Dr FNr FPr Dr FNr FPr 
NAV 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 8% 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 3%
Deltatime 83% 17% 60% 99% 1% 64% 83% 17% 56% 79% 21% 69%
DiffFSN 1% 99% 28% 2% 98% 7% 1% 99% 27% 30% 70% 20%
NAV, Deltatime 83% 17% 60% 99% 1% 64% 83% 17% 56% 79% 21% 69%
NAV, DiffFSN 1% 99% 24% 3% 97% 7% 1% 99% 27% 30% 70% 20%
Deltatime, DiffFSN 1% 99% 28% 3% 97% 17% 1% 99% 23% 23% 77% 18%
Deltatime, DiffFSN, NAV 1% 99% 24% 15% 85% 17% 1% 99% 23% 23% 77% 18%
Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 
NAV 100% 0% 3% 100% 0% 2% 100% 0% 6% 
Deltatime 81% 19% 69% 76% 24% 64% 100% 0% 81% 
DiffFSN 17% 83% 20% 36% 64% 17% 1% 99% 2% 
NAV, Deltatime 81% 19% 69% 98% 2% 64% 100% 0% 81% 
NAV, DiffFSN 17% 83% 20% 36% 64% 17% 1% 99% 2% 
Deltatime, DiffFSN 14% 86% 19% 36% 64% 16% 1% 99% 4% 
Deltatime, DiffFSN, NAV 14% 86% 19% 36% 64% 16% 2% 98% 4% 
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